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CASE NOTE
Maslenjak v. United States: A concern about prosecutors’
limitless leverage regarding the international refugee policy
Fengming Jin1
I.

Introduction

American citizenship has been long recognized as a
“precious right,” and that [i]t would be difficult to exaggerate its
value and importance.2 While many Americans are blessed with
that right by virtue of their birth, many others have obtained it
by virtue of naturalization. Throughout the American history,
naturalized Americans have enriched all areas of the national life;
business, government, law, science, sports, and the arts. A
naturalized citizen is as much a citizen as any other:
“[c]itizenship obtained through naturalization is not a secondclass citizenship.” 3
Fifty-years ago, in the landmark case, Afroyim v. Rusk, the
Court held that Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from
taking away citizenship without the citizen’s assent.4 Regarding
the holding, there is a critical exception in the regulation, which
prohibits procured citizenship “contrary to law.” 5 In terms of
the interpretation of “contrary to law,” 6 the circuit courts had
split on the question of whether the false statement must be
material to the granting of citizenship, under the circumstance
which the predicate crime is a false statement to immigration
officials. 7

Associate Member, 2018-2019 Immigration and Human Rights Law Review
Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
3 Knauer v. U.S., 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946).
4 387 U.S. 253, 254, 87 S. Ct. 1660, 1661 (1967).
5 18 U.S.C.§1425(a) (Lexis 2018).
6 Id.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) (Lexis 2018) (prohibiting “knowingly mak[ing] any false
statement under oath” in a naturalization proceeding).
1
2

In the recent case, Maslenjak v. United States, 8 the
Supreme Court resolved the circuit split, holding that if the
underlying illegal act is a false statement to government officials,
the government must show that the falsehood influenced the
decision to grant citizenship.9
This case note will first address those critical facts
controlling the issue(s) in part II. Next, part III will introduce the
Supreme Court’s holding on each relevant issue. Part III will
discuss prior law, including a reading of the regulation10 and the
circuit split prior to the case at hand. Moreover, part IV will
describe and analyze the Supreme Court’s reasoning and
decision. Lastly, part V will conclude this case note.
II.

Facts

Divna Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb, lived in Bosnia during its
civil war in the 1990s.11 In 1998, she sought refugee status in
the United States.12 Maslenjak stated under oath that her family
faced persecution from both sides of the war: from Muslims,
because of the family’s Serbian ethnicity, and from Serbs,
because her husband had fled conscription in the Bosnian
Serb Army.13 Based on her testimony, the family was granted
refugee status. 14 She was naturalized as a U.S. citizen. 15 Six
years after arriving in the United States, Maslenjak applied
for naturalization.16 On the application form, Maslenjak marked
“no” under oath to two questions asking whether she had ever
lied to government officials during immigration proceedings.17
137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
Id. at 1923.
10 18 U.S.C.§1425(a).
11 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1920.
16 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923.
17 Id.
8
9

She affirmed those responses under oath in a
subsequent interview.18
Soon after, the government found that Maslenjak had in
fact made false statements. 19 Immigration officials uncovered
records showing that Maslenjak’s husband had been an officer
in the Bosnian Serb Army and had served in a brigade involved
in massacring approximately 8000 civilian Bosnian Muslims.20
Within a year, he was convicted of making false statements on
immigration documents.21 Maslenjak, testifying in an attempt to
stop his deportation, admitted that she had been aware of his role
in the war.22
In response, the government charged Maslenjak with
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) by “knowingly ‘procur[ing]’” her
naturalization “contrary to law.”23 The underlying illegality was
making false statements under oath in a naturalization
proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) — namely, the
answers in her naturalization application and interview assuring
her past honesty. 24 Despite an objection by Maslenjak, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
instructed the jury that any falsehood, regardless of whether it
influenced the decision to grant naturalization, would suffice for
a conviction.25 The jury found Maslenjak guilty, and the district
court accordingly stripped her of citizenship.26
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s
jury instructions. 27 According to the Sixth Circuit, the plain
language of the statute and the overall statutory scheme of
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012).
Id. at 1924.
Id.
Id.
U.S. v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 686 (6th Cir. 2016).

denaturalization did not compel a materiality requirement. 28
Because making a false statement to immigration officials
violated naturalization law, the court reasoned that the making
of such a statement automatically constituted procuring
citizenship “contrary to law” in violation of § 1425(a);
regardless of whether the statement influenced the
naturalization outcome.
III.

Holding

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, held
that: (1) the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) -- which prohibits
“procur[ing], contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” - makes clear that, to secure a conviction, the Federal
Government must establish that the defendant’s illegal act
played a role in her acquisition of citizenship; 29 (2) when the
underlying illegality alleged in a Section 1425(a) prosecution is
a false statement to government officials, a jury must decide
whether the false statement so altered the naturalization process
as to have influenced an award of citizenship; 30 and (3)
measured against this analysis, the jury instructions in this case
were in error, and the government’s assertion that any
instructional error was harmless is left for resolution on
remand.31
IV.

Discussion of Prior Law

Although the Constitution expressly authorizes Congress
“to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,”32 it contains no
corresponding general authority to strip Americans-either
natural-born or naturalized-of their citizenship. That is no
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 682–83.
Maslenjak v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. at 1921 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 1922 (2017).
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 4.

oversight: “in our country the people are sovereign, and the
Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking
away their relationship to the people by taking away their
citizenship.” 33 Thus, as a general matter, the only way
American citizenship can be lost is “by the voluntary
renunciation or abandonment by the citizen himself.”34 There is
but one exception to that rule: “naturalization unlawfully
procured can be set aside.” 35
A. The Federal Statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§1425(a); 1015
(a); and 8 U.S.C. §1451(e).
Section 1425(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code
provides that a person:
Whoever knowingly procures or attempts to
procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of
any person … Shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than [10 to 25 years], …
or both.
18 U.S.C.§1425(a).
Upon a conviction, Section 1451(e) of Title 8 of the United
States Code requires revocation of that person’s certificate of
naturalization as provided in the Statute:
When a person shall be convicted under section
1425 of Title 18 of knowingly procuring
naturalization in violation of law, the court in
which such conviction is had shall thereupon
revoke, set aside, and declare void the final order
33
34
35

Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 267 n.23.

admitting such person to citizenship, and shall
declare the certificate of naturalization of such
person to be canceled.
8 U.S.C.§1451(e).
One of the conducts “contrary to law”36 is “making false
statements under oath,” as provided under 18 U.S.C. §1015(a):
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement
under oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter
relating to, or under, or by virtue of any law of
the United States relating to naturalization,
citizenship, or registry of aliens … Shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. §1015(a).
Due to widespread fraud and abuse in procurement of
naturalization, Act of June 29, 1906, of which predecessor to 18
U.S.C. §1425 was part, was passed as attempt to remedy and to
prevent occurrence of fraud in naturalization proceedings.37 The
Regulation provides the basis for the Government to strip the
citizenship from a naturalized citizen if he/she procured the
citizenship “contrary to law.” Further, under 8 U.S.C. §1451, it
granted the Government the power to revoke naturalized
citizenship if the citizenship was procured by fraud or illegally
procured.38 An element of “materiality” is not mentioned in the
plain language in Section 1451(e), however, it was required in
the prior subsections of Section 1451.
Under 18 U.S.C. §1015(a), a conviction under Section

36
37
38

18 U.S.C. §1425(a).
See 18 U.S.C. §1425.
See 8 U.S.C. §1451.

1451(e) and Section 1425 (a) can be found for false swearing in
naturalization proceedings. 39 Regarding the conviction,
“materiality” was not an element of the crime of knowingly
making false statement under oath in naturalization proceeding
under the Regulation. However, “any false statement,” whether
such false statement is material or immaterial, could satisfy the
requirement by Section 1015(a).40 Therefore, under plain text of
the Regulation, materiality of false statement is not an element
of §1015(a).
B. The circuit split on the Regulations
Courts have grappled with delineating the precise contours
of the window for denaturalization entitled by the Regulations.
One area the jurisdiction is split on is delineating the question of
whether a false statement must be material to the granting of
citizenship, when the predicate crime is the false statement to
immigration officials. For example, in some jurisdictions, any
false statement, regardless of impact on the naturalization
decision, justifies a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).41
However, in other jurisdictions, to find a conviction under
Section 1425(a), Courts require the fact in the false statement
must have been material, and the naturalized citizen must have
procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or
concealment.42 The courts further advocates for a definition of
materiality that is consistent with general legal usage: a material
misrepresentation must have at least a natural tendency to
produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified for
See 18 U.S.C. §1015.
Id.
41 U.S. v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2016) .
42 U.S. v. Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d 532, 534 (1st Cir. 2015); See also U.S. v. Alferahin,
433 F.3d 1148, 1154–56 (9th Cit. 2006) (The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit holds that §1425(a) contains a materiality requirement); U.S.
v. Aladekoba, 61 F. App’x 27, 28 (4th Cir. 2003). (Held that in order to convict
under 18 U.S.C. §1425(a), …the statements must be material in order to be
contrary to law).
39
40

citizenship.43
IV. Opinion Description and Analysis
A. Reasoning by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court resolved the jurisdiction split, vacated
and remanded the case.44 Justice Kagan45 wrote for the Court,
held that: the Government must establish that an illegal act by
the defendant played some role in her acquisition of citizenship.
46
When the illegal act is a false statement, that means
demonstrating that the defendant lied about facts that would have
mattered to an immigration official, because they would have
justified denying naturalization or would predictably have led to
other facts warranting that result.47
The Supreme Court first took a close look at Section
1425(a), and concluded that “to procure” something is “to get
possession of” it, 48 and “procur[ing], contrary to law,
naturalization” 49 meant obtaining citizenship illegally. 50 The
“most natural” reading of that phrase, in turn, was that “the
illegal act must have somehow contributed to the obtaining of
citizenship. 51 The Supreme Court suggested an example
regarding this “most natural” reading of the phrase: consider if
someone said to you: “John obtained that painting illegally.”52
You might imagine that he stole it off the walls of a museum; or
that he paid for it with a forged check.53 But in all events, you
U.S. v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d at 1151 (9th Cit. 2006).
Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1931.
45 Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,
joined the majority.
46 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923.
47 Id.
48 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1924.
49 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012).
50 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1925.
51 Id. at 1925.
52 Id.
53 Id.
43
44

would imagine illegal acts in some kind of means-end relation—
or otherwise said, in some kind of causal relation—to the
painting’s acquisition.54
And the same goes for naturalization.55 If whatever illegal
conduct occurring within the naturalization process was a causal
dead-end, then the act cannot support a charge that the applicant
obtained naturalization illegally.56
The government’s argument to the contrary, the court
observed, “falters on the way language naturally works.” 57
Imagine, the court suggested, a scenario in which “an applicant
for citizenship fills out the necessary paperwork in a government
office with a knife tucked away in her handbag (but never
mentioned or used).”58 Although the applicant has violated the
law barring weapons in federal buildings, and “has surely done
so in the course of procuring citizenship,”59 the court concluded,
she has not obtained citizenship “contrary to law,”60 because the
relationship between the violation of law and the acquisition of
citizenship “are in that example merely coincidental: The one
has no causal relation to the other.”61
The Court was also concerned that a broad reading of the
Regulation by the government would create a profound
mismatch between the requirements for naturalization on the one
hand and those for denaturalization on the other. 62 The
immigration statute requires all applicants for citizenship to have
“good moral character.”63 The Government argued, observed by
the Court, that some legal violations that do not justify denying
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1926.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1926-1927.
8 U.S.C. §§1427(a)(3), 1101(f).

citizenship under that definition would nevertheless revoke
it later.64 Regarding the argument made by the Government, the
Court stated that the statute’s description of “good moral
character” singles out a specific class of lies “false testimony for
the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits” as a reason to
deny naturalization.65 The rationale behind this reasoning by the
Court, is that the Court concerned a broad reading of the Statute
will open “the door to a world of disquieting consequences,”66
in which a lie “would always provide a basis for rescinding
citizenship,” 67 even if the lie merely resulted from
“embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy.” 68 Indeed, the
Court suggested, the Government’s rule would give “prosecutors
nearly limitless leverage” 69 a concern for many justices in the
recent relevant cases.70
Therefore, the Court found that the general statutory
context reinforced Maslenjak’s reading of § 1425(a)71 because
the Government’s reading would create a “profound
mismatch” between the requirements for naturalization on the
one hand and those for denaturalization on the other. And this
effect, coupled with the fact that many individuals may, for
innocuous reasons, fail to be entirely truthful regarding
inconsequential matters while navigating the citizenship
process.72 The Court further found that Congress intended such
severe consequences would require “far stronger textual support”
than that provided in the statutory text of § 1425(a) which
requires a causal relationship between the illegal act and the

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1926-1927.
Id. at 1927.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bond v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); Yates v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1926.
Id. at 1927.

procurement of citizenship.73
Next, the Court took a close examination of a “more
operational” question of how the causation requirement should
apply in practice for prosecutions in which a false statement to
government officials was the predicate illegal act.74 The Court
held that the issue a jury must decide in a case like this one is
“whether a false statement sufficiently altered those processes as
to have influenced an award of citizenship.”75
The Court articulated two means by which a false statement
could have the required effect on the naturalization decision by
adopting an objective approach. First, if the misrepresented facts
themselves justified denying citizenship; and second, if the
misrepresentation threw investigators off a trail that could have
led to disqualifying facts. 76 In the first scenario, “an obvious
causal link” exists between the falsehood and the granting
of citizenship. 77 In the second scenario, dubbed the
“investigation-based theory,” the government can establish the
requisite causal connection with a two-part showing.78 First, the
government must show that the misrepresented fact was
“sufficiently relevant” to a qualification for citizenship, such that
an immigration official seeking evidence about naturalization
criteria would have been prompted to engage in
further investigation. 79 Next, the government must establish
that the ensuing investigation “would predictably have disclosed”
a dis-qualifying fact.80 Even if the government succeeds in this
two-part showing, the defendant can overcome it by
Id.
Id.
75 Id. at 1928.
76 Id. at 1928-1929.
77 Id. at 1928.
78 Id. at 1929.
79 Id.
80 Id. Quoting Kungys, 485 U.S. at 774. (This “demanding but still practicable”
standard, id. at 1930, accounts for the difficulty of proving the path of a
hypothetical investigation, as well as the fact that the defendant, rather than the
government, would have caused that evidentiary difficulty. id. at 1929.)
73
74

demonstrating that she is actually qualified for citizenship
because it is a “complete defense.”81
Applying this analysis, the Court found error in the district
court’s jury instructions.82 Because the instructions stated that
no causal link was necessary between Maslenjak’s false
statements and the government’s decision to grant her
naturalization, the jury did not make any of the required findings
regarding causation. 83 The Court vacated the judgment of the
Sixth Circuit, remanded the question of whether Maslenjak’s
misrepresentations would have affected the decision to grant her
citizenship.84
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in
the judgment.85 He agreed with the Court’s reasoning that the
statute’s plain text and structure required the government to
establish causation as an element of a conviction
under § 1425(a). 86 However, He argued that the Court should
have left to lower courts the task of fleshing out the precise
causal relationship required between the illegality and the
granting of citizenship. 87 He also points out that the question
presented and the briefing before the Court focused primarily on
“whether the statute contains a materiality element, not on the
contours of a causation requirement.”88
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment. 89 From his
perspective, while the majority viewed the statute’s plain text as
containing a causation requirement, he eschewed that framing.
Instead, Justice Alito reasoned that when the predicate crime is
a false statement, the language of § 1425(a) contains an implied
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 1930.
Id.
Id. at 1930-1931.
Id. at 1931.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1931-1932.
Id.
Id. at 1932.

materiality element.90 In his view, the federal law under which
Maslenjak was convicted does require her lie to have been
material, but it “does not require proof that a false statement
actually had some effect on the naturalization decision.”91
To be material, the false statement must have a “natural
tendency to influence” the outcome of a naturalization
decision. 92 Understood in this way, Section 1425(a) does not
require proof that a false statement actually had some effect on
the naturalization decision. The operative statutory language“procure” naturalization “contrary to law”-imposes no such
requirement.93 For example, Justice Alito suggested, eight coworkers jointly buy two season tickets to see their favorite
football team play.94 They all write their names on a piece of
paper and place the slips in a hat to see who will get the tickets
for the big game with their team’s traditional rival.95 One of the
friends puts his name in twice, and his name is drawn.96 Under
such circumstance, the guy “procured” the tickets “contrary to”
the rules of the drawing even though he might have won if he
had put his name in only once.97
B. A 9-0 Decision: An Outcome Highly Driven by the
Concern about Unbounded Prosecutorial Discretion by the
Government.
In regard of the holding of the instant case, §1425(a)
requires a causal link between false statements and the decision
to grant citizenship. In the majority’s opinion, the Court

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

expressed its concern about the unbounded prosecutorial
discretion by the Government through a broad reading of the
Statute. Therefore, the Court rejected a broad argument by the
government that any lie told over the course of the naturalization
process could be the basis for denaturalization. The holding in
Maslenjak indicated the Court’s attempt to develop a coherent
approach to interpreting statutes that raise prosecutorial
discretion issues, over a potential incompatibility between the
gravity of an offense and the attendant consequences.
In the oral argument, Justices evinced hostility towards the
Government’s broad reading.98
Chief Justice Roberts stated that there was “certainly a
problem of prosecutorial abuse” under the government’s reading,
since “the government will have the opportunity to denaturalize
anyone they want.” 99 As for testing the limits of the
Government’s position, Chief Justice Roberts asked a question,
in which 20 years after a person was naturalized as a citizen,
whether the Government officials simply notify that person, that
he is not an American citizen after all because of a minor
criminal offense, even if there was no arrest, conducted by him
20 years ago and forgot to disclose in his application form
seeking American citizenship. 100 The Government lawyer
persistently held an unyielding position that the Government
may revoke the citizenship of Americans who made even trivial
misstatements in their naturalization proceedings.101
After the questions asked by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy also questioned the Government’s position. Justice
Kennedy pointed out that the Government lawyer should arguing
for what citizenship is and ought to mean, instead of demeaning
Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) (No. 16309).
99 Id. at 54.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 54-55.
98

the priceless value of citizenship.102
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor expressed doubts at the
Government’s stance that even seemingly inconsequential lies,
like those about one’s weights103 or a childhood nickname,104
could be the basis for denaturalization. Justice Kanga and
Sotomayor’s questions also indicated the Court’s concern, that
if the Court takes the Government’s position, a lie would always
provide a basis for rescinding citizenship, even if the lie merely
resulted from “embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy.”105
Justice Breyer addressed that the Government’s reading
“would throw into doubt the citizenship of vast percentages of
all naturalized citizens.”106 Justice Ginsburg raised her doubt by
asking maybe “a simple-minded question,” that “how can an
immaterial statement procure naturalization?”
It is not surprising, that the Court delivered its opinion,
although having already decided that the plain text of the statute
does not required a causal link between false statements and the
granting of citizenship, the causal link should be required to find
a conviction under Section 1425(a) by using the most natural
reading of the Statute. The doubts raised by the Justices in the
oral argument was apparent in the Court’s opinion.
The Court addressed that the Government’s broad reading
of the statute as opening the door to a world of disquieting
consequences.107 For instance, the Court gave an example of a
woman who, while applying for citizenship, failed to disclose
membership in an online support group or a prior speeding
violation, and a prosecutor could scour her paperwork and bring
a §1425(a) charge on that basis, even many years after she
Id. at 55.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) (No.
16-309).
104 Id. at 30-31.
105 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1927.
106 Id. at 32.
107 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1927.
102
103

became a citizen.108 Permitting such prosecutions would give
prosecutors nearly limitless leverage. Without an explicit,
textual expression of congressional intent, such limitless
leverage held by the Government could not be countenanced by
the Court.109 The concern about prosecutorial discretion by the
Government is hence a crucial indicator driving the Court’s
opinion to reject the Government’s broad reading of the
Statute.110
Regarding the concern, the Court has already delivered a
line of statutory interpretation cases in which the Court,
concerned about the ever-expanding criminal code and the
attendant shift of power into the hands of prosecutors, has
spurned broad government readings of federal criminal statutes.
For example, in Yates v. United States,111 a 2015 decision,
the Court overturned the conviction of a fishing boat captain,
who had thrown overboard undersized red grouper found on his
vessel, for violating an obstruction of justice statute that
prohibits destroying or altering “any record, document or
tangible object.”112 The Court found that the law covered only
physical items that held information, but not fish disposed of to
frustrate an investigation.113 That conclusion drew a sharp retort
from Justice Kagan in a dissenting opinion, who wrote that “a
‘tangible object’ is an object that’s tangible.” 114 This narrow
interpretation of the obstruction law in the Yates decision
required a majority of the Justices to ignore the obvious meaning
of “tangible” to impose a limit on prosecutorial discretion.
Accepting the government’s position would mean almost
anything that someone changed or disposed of could result in an
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1931.
135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
Id. at 1079-1080.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1092.

obstruction of justice charge, especially because the statute
applies to conduct even when there is no pending investigation.
Later, in McDonnell v. United States,115 decided in 2016,
the Court unanimously overturned the conviction of former
Virginia governor who had received over $100,000 in gifts from
a friend interested in securing government support for a new
dietary supplement. 116 The Justices concluded that merely
“arranging a meeting, contacting another official or hosting an
event” did not constitute an “official act” under federal bribery
and unlawful gifts law.117 The court expressed concern that “we
cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the
government will use it responsibly.” 118 The narrower
interpretation keeps prosecutors from using the statute to reach
conduct many would consider to be a part of ordinary politics.
On June 33, 2017, the Supreme Court announced its
decision in the instant case, Maslenjak v. United States,
overturning a conviction for unlawfully procuring citizenship by
making a false statement on an application.119
The apprehension in these decisions is that the
Government lawyer is essentially arguing that judges should not
be too concerned about a broad interpretation of the law, because
the Government can be trusted to bring only those cases that
involve real misconduct and not mere technical violations. The
problem with this approach is that it is often difficult to
distinguish benign conduct that might be illegal under a broad
interpretation of the law but should not be pursued from
wrongdoing acts truly worthy of a criminal prosecution. The
issue is especially pertinent when in some cases, the impact of
simply filing criminal charges can be so significant and a “not

115
116
117
118
119

136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
See id. at 2362.
See id. at 2368.
Id. at 2374.
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).

guilty” verdict does little to restore a reputation. Therefore,
Maslenjak indicated the Court’s anxiety about such cases
involving prosecutorial abuse. However, the reasoning in the
instant case left some questions, which were also mentioned in
the concurring opinions by the Justices.
C. Materiality vs. Causation.
In the Majority’s opinion, the Court is concerned about the
Government’s broad reading of Section 1425(a) would create a
“profound mismatch” between the requirements for
naturalization on the one hand and those for denaturalization on
the other. This mismatch could be more crucial when many
individuals may, for innocuous reasons, fail to be entirely
truthful regarding inconsequential matters while answering the
questions to the Government officials.120 Therefore, the Court
held § 1425(a) must require a causal relationship between the
illegal act and the procurement of citizenship.121
In the Briefs written by the parties, 122 the Petitioner
arguing that a materially element is required by Section 1425(a)
and Section 1015(a).123 Therefore, the Petitioner further arguing,
that the Sixth Circuit misconstrued Section 1425(a) by
upholding a conviction where the Government failed to prove a
causal link between the predicate violation and the procurement
of naturalization. 124 In response to that, the United States
arguing that materiality is not an element of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a).
125
The Government also arguing that the Petitioner’s claim that
Id. at 1927.
Id.
122 See Brief for the United States, Maslenjak 137 S. Ct. (No. 16-309)
(scotusblog); see also Brief for Petitioner, Maslenjak 137 S. Ct (No. 16-309)
(scotusblog).
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materiality is an element of 18 U.S.C. 1015(a) is not properly
before this Court and lacks merits in any event.126 If Congress
had wanted a materiality requirement to apply to Section 1425(a),
the Government suggests, it would have said so specifically – as
it has done in other statutes, either by using the word “material”
or by using other terms, such as “perjury,” that are “understood
to include a materiality requirement.”127 But it didn’t do so here,
the Government continues, which “provides compelling
evidence that the statute does not require such proof.” 128
Reading a “materiality” requirement into the law would also
make it difficult to apply the law consistently, the Government
adds, because Section 1425(a) is an “umbrella” statute that
applies to anyone whose naturalization is obtained through
methods that are “contrary to other laws.”129 The statute applies
to a wide range of underlying offenses, some of which – such as
making a false statement under oath with regard to a material
fact – already require materiality, while others – such as bribing
an immigration official – do not or cannot.
The Petitioner sees this reasoning as a point in its favor.130
She counters that the absence of the word “material” from
Section 1425(a) is “particularly unilluminating,” precisely
because it would not have made sense for Congress to include it
when the statute “applies to any actions ‘contrary to law’ that
procure naturalization, not just false statements that do so.”131
The Petitioner’s interpretation of Section 1425(a) to
include a materiality requirement is also more consistent, the
party argues, with the civil statute that authorizes the government
to revoke citizenship that was obtained through the
“concealment of a material fact or a willful
126
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Id.

misrepresentation.” 132 It would be “anomalous,” it maintains,
for Congress to “authorize denaturalization in a criminal
proceeding but not a civil proceeding based on the very same
statement.”133
But the Government dismisses any alleged inconsistencies
in the two statutes. First, it pointed out, that another part of the
same civil statute allows citizenship to be revoked if it was
“illegally procured” – a term that does not require materiality.134
Second, the civil and criminal denaturalization statutes are not
coextensive.135
The Petitioner further argues that Section 1425(a) requires
a causal connection between the false statements and efforts to
obtain American citizenship.136 “It would be odd indeed,” the
Petitioner reasons, “to say that a person procures (or attempts to
procure) something contrary to law if the violation, in fact, has
no effect on the proceeding.” For false statements, the Petitioner
says, this means that the Government must show that the
statement was material, because a statement that is not material
“cannot ‘procure’ an official decision.”137 This interpretation is
most consistent with common sense, the Petitioner suggests,
because there is no reason “Congress would want to punish (with
criminal fines and imprisonment of up to five years) conduct that
has no tendency to influence official decision-making.” 138 If
anything, the Petitioner continues, “the natural assumption
would be just the opposite: that Congress meant to reserve such
heavy punishment for statements of consequence.”139
As for the holding of the instant case, the Court did not
Id.
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(scotusblog).
135 Id.
136 See Brief for Petitioner, Maslenjak 137 S. Ct (No. 16-309) (scotusblog).
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fully address whether the Regulations require a “materiality”
element.140 Instead of this, the Court held that the Government
must establish that an illegal act by the defendant played some
role in her acquisition of citizenship.141 When the illegal act is a
false statement, that means demonstrating that the defendant lied
about facts that would have mattered to an immigration official,
because they would have justified denying naturalization or
would predictably have led to other facts warranting that
result. 142 Although the Majority used “materiality” and
“causation” as two inter-changeable terms in its reasoning, it
held that there was no finding that the citizen's false statement in
the naturalization process that she had made no false statements
to the government was not shown to be causally connected to the
decision to grant naturalization.143
However, “materiality” and “causation” are two different
legal standards. As mentioned in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring
opinion, joined with Justice Thomas, although the practical test
expressed in the Majority’s opinion is surely thoughtful and may
prove entirely sound, the question presented before the Court
should focus primarily on “whether the statute contains
a materiality element, not on the contours of a causation
requirement.” 144 The outcomes should be different if the
Regulation requires “materiality” as an element instead of a pure
causal link under some circumstances. 145 For example, as
suggested by Justice Alito, eight co-workers jointly buy two
season tickets to see their favorite football team play.146 They
all write their names on a piece of paper and place the slips in a
hat to see who will get the tickets for the big game with their
140
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team’s traditional rival.147 One of the friends puts his name in
twice, and his name is drawn.148 Under such circumstance, the
guy “procured” the tickets “contrary to” the rules of the drawing
even though he might have won if he had put his name in only
once.149
In Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion, he further stated
that the lower courts have not had a chance to pass on any of
these questions in the first instance illustrated by the Court.150
The reality is that most cases cited by the Court “have [again]
focused only on the materiality (not causation) question; none
has tested the elaborate operational details advanced today.”151
Regarding the complicated practical test designed by the
Court in the instant case, Justice Gorsuch concerned about
whether the Majority should step such far to bear the risk of
yielding the insight of their “thoughtful colleagues on the district
and circuit benches.”152 The Court was using the materiality and
causation as two inter-changeable terms in its majority’s opinion.
However, the Petitioner treated the two concepts separately in its
arguments. For example, in the oral argument, the Petitioner
started the argument by asking for a causal link between the false
statement and the procuring of the citizenship. 153 Justice
Kennedy asked the Petitioner attorney for whether the false
statement made by the Petitioner is material. 154 Petitioner
admitted material should be treated as an element, but whether
the Petitioner’s false statement is material to procure the
citizenship should be a question left to the jury.155
Id.
Id.
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Such argument makes clear that materiality and causation
are two different concepts in the context of Petitioner’s argument.
It could also be indicated in the Brief of Petitioner. 156 The
Petitioner attorney made two separated argument in the brief,
asking for: (1) “Section 1425 requires a causal link between the
predicate violation and the procurement of naturalization;” 157
and (2) “Section 1015(a) requires proof of a materially false
statement.” 158 There is no place in the brief for Government
even mentioned an argument denying a causal link. The
Government only argued the materiality is not an element
required by either Section 1425(a) or Section 1015(a). 159
However, the holding by the Majority found both materiality and
causation as required by the Statutes.
In Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, he repeated the
standard of the materiality, a standard also mentioned by the
Majority in its opinion, that is: a person violates the statute by
procuring naturalization through an illegal false statement which
has a “natural tendency to influence” the outcome—that is, the
obtaining of naturalization. 160 Understood in this way, Justice
Alito further stated, that Section 1425(a) does not require proof
that a false statement actually had some effect on the
naturalization decision. 161 Because the operative statutory
language-“procure” naturalization “contrary to law”-imposes no
such requirement. 162 Justice Alito suggested an example,
imagine, a runner who holds the world’s record in an event
wants to make sure she wins the gold medal at the Olympics, so
she takes a performance enhancing drug.163 She wins the race
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but fails a drug test and is disqualified.164 The second-place time
is slow, and sportswriters speculate that she would have won
without taking the drug.165 But it would be entirely consistent
with standard English usage for the race officials to say that she
“procured” her first-place finish “contrary to” the governing
rules.166
In Justice Alito’s opinion, the example illustrates that the
language of 18 U. S. C. §1425(a) does not require that an illegal
false statement have a demonstrable effect on the naturalization
decision.167 Instead, the statute applies when a person makes an
illegal false statement to obtain naturalization, and that false
statement is material to the outcome. There is no “indication that
Congress meant to require more.”168
In the two concurring opinions, “causation” puts a higher
burden on the Government to prove the conviction than
“materiality” did. It could be majority’s intent to step further to
use a stronger standard to avoid the Government’s broad reading
of the Statute raising the argument later, that “a defendant
knowingly performs a substantial act that he or she thinks will
procure naturalization, that is sufficient for conviction.”169 The
Majority intentionally took a more clear approach to articulate a
new test to avoid sentencing discretion granted by ambiguous
statutes.
V. Conclusion
This case is the result of the concern by the Court about a
mismatch: one between the gravity of the offense and the
severity of the consequences, due to the mandatory
denaturalization upon conviction in the Statutes. Maslenjak,
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particularly in the oral argument, the Justices indicated such
concerns of growing anxiety about prosecutorial overreach in
their reasoning.
Moreover, by giving hypothetical cases, the Court
addressing its concern about potential problematic reality, not
referring to cases plainly arise from a mismatch between statute
and defendant, but rather due to a potential incompatibility
between the gravity of an offense and the consequences. The
broad reading of the statute will likewise result naturalized
citizen accused of immigration-related crimes. Namely, a minor
lie would be met with the drastic punishment of denaturalization,
without any opportunity for a mitigating exercise of the
prosecution. The Court made a compromise of a wait-and-see
approach, which might offer more insight to the Court by district
and circuit courts, for the urgent need to articulate a clear
approach for interpreting broadly worded criminal statutes.

